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The Law on Intervention: 
Africa's Pathbreaking Model 
JEREMY LEVITT 
In the past twenty years the people of the African continent have experienced human suffering on a scale unparalleled 
in human history. Millions of Africans, 
including women and children, have been 
killed by deadly conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (3 million), Sudan (2.5 
million), Rwanda (1 million), Burundi 
(300,000) and Liberia (250,000). Besides 
these huge fatalities, there have also been the 
harsh effects of warfare on human, social and 
economic development, the breakdown of 
the rule of law, and most important, the cata­
strophic impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
on Africa's human architecture. 
The international system of peace and 
security, including the scheme provided 
under the United Nations Charter frame­
work, has not offered a viable strategy to 
reduce armed conflict and human suffering 
in Africa. The UN Security Council has been 
uninterested in or slow to react to conflict in 
Africa. Consequently, African states and 
their organisations have sought to fashion 
African solutions to African problems by 
creating innovative and robust regional secu­
rity mechanisms. These structures are 
evolving the law of intervention, and in my 
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view have been the most credible examples 
and single greatest driving force in the devel­
opment of the doctrine of humanitarian inter­
vention. 
For the purposes of this article, humani­
tarian intervention can be taken to mean an 
intervention taken initially outside the UN 
Charter schemata and involving the use or 
threat of force against a state. Attempting to 
alleviate conditions in which a substantial 
part of the state's population is threatened 
with death or suffering on a grand scale, the 
intervener deploys armed forces in the state 
and, at the least, makes clear that it is willing 
to use force if its operation is resisted. 
This article seeks to examine the sum and 
substance of the evolving intervention 
regime in Africa. I employ a structural 
approach to highlight the normative frame­
work governing humanitarian intervention in 
Africa at the sub-regional and regional 
levels. The article is meant to be a snapshot 
rather than a comprehensive treatment of the 
law of intervention in Africa. Space con­
straints preclude examination of the legality 
of the various post-Cold War, unilateral 
African interventions (i.e., those that took 
place without prior Security Council authori­
sation or valid state consent). These include 
the interventions by the Economic Commu­
nity of West African States (ECOWAS) in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guinea and Cote d' Ivoire; that in the Central 
African Republic by the Mission for the 
Implementation of the Bangui Agreement; 
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and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) operation in Lesotho.11 
will nonetheless discuss the efficacy of the 
regional practice, law and frameworks that 
gave these interventions impetus. The discus­
sion that follows will also include an analysis 
of the peace and security framework of the 
new African Union that replaced the Organi­
sation of African Unity as the premier conti­
nental organisation in Africa in March 2001. 
Historically among the most conservative 
subscribers to the international law principles 
of state sovereignty, non-intervention, and ter­
ritorial integrity, African states and regional 
organisations today have adopted, opera-
tionalised and acted under norm-creating 
mechanisms that are chiselling away tradi­
tional prohibitions on the use of force 
enshrined in the UN Charter. 
The evolution of the intervention regime 
in Africa reveals that it is the first region to 
advance a comprehensive collective security 
and intervention regime. From a normative 
standpoint, Africa's collective security regime 
is more advanced than any other, including the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
Western Myopia 
In international studies, Africa is viewed 
as a pariah—a basket case, not a market place. 
Most policymakers and legal academics con­
sider African states to be objects rather than 
subjects of international law. This explains 
why a significant portion of the wide body of 
literature on the law of the use of force, and 
more generally peacekeeping and humani­
tarian intervention, is heavily biased and 
flawed. The geopolitical, Eurocentric, and 
linear bias in Western legal academia is 
astounding when it is applied to Africa. This 
bias is in part due to a lack of Western intel­
lectual interest in the continent; however, 
international lawyers typically lack multidis-
ciplinary training and regional expertise, par­
ticularly on the developing world. 
As a result, topical discussions on, for 
example, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
humanitarian intervention, and other peace­
making developments in Africa are either 
uninformed or inadequately analysed. More 
often than not, when analysts assess African 
security issues, they do so with a voice remi­
niscent of the British Colonial Office in the 
eighteenth century—paternalistic and 
unaware. This phenomenon is unfortunate. It 
creates an environment enabling the produc­
tion of analytically weak scholarship. The 
academy can do better. It is time to pay closer 
attention to international law developments 
and influences from the world's second-
largest continent, the one with the highest 
density of states: Africa. 
The sections that follow assess the evolu­
tion of the law of intervention in Africa by 
analysing African state practice, treaty-law 
developments, and Security Council 
responses, or lack thereof, to them. Again, pri­
mary attention will be given to the evolving 
regional collective security and human rights 
structures of ECOWAS, SADC, and the newly 
formed African Union. 
ECOWAS 
In 1975, ECOWAS was founded by treaty. 
Its main aim at the time was to spur economic 
integration and development in west Africa. 
I. For an analysis of the legality of most of the aforementioned interventions, see Jeremy Levitt, "African Inter­
ventionist States and International Law", in African Interventionist States, ed. Oliver Furley and Roy May (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2001). 
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Regional security was an important but not 
vital concern. ECOWAS later adopted a Pro­
tocol on Non-Aggression (1978), and a Pro­
tocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on 
Defence (1981). Neither the treaty nor the 
protocols empowered ECOWAS to launch 
peacekeeping missions (although the 1981 
protocol did empower it to intervene in con­
flicts that were "externally engineered"). In 
1989, ECOWAS was tested with the eruption 
of the Liberian civil war (1989-97), in which, 
owing to international inaction, it was forced 
to intervene unilaterally (i.e., without Security 
Council authorisation) to halt the conflict. 
Liberia 
In November 1992, two full years after 
ECOWAS intervened in Liberia, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 788, which placed 
an arms and petroleum embargo on the 
country and empowered ECOWAS to enforce 
its terms. The following year, in September 
1993, it adopted Resolution 866, which estab­
lished the UN Observer Group in Liberia 
(UNOMIL). This, for the first time in UN his­
tory, co-deployed forces with another mission 
(i.e., ECOMOG, the armed monitoring group 
of ECOWAS) that was already under way. 
Needless to say, ECOMOG continued to serve 
as primary keeper of the peace. 
Moreover, between January 1991 and 
November 1996, the Security Council adopted 
fifteen resolutions relating to the situation in 
Liberia, and the president of the Security 
Council issued nine presidential statements in 
this connection. Almost every resolution and 
statement commended ECOWAS for its 
efforts, asked UN member states to support it 
financially, requested African states to con­
tribute troops to its mission, and condemned 
attacks against it by rebel factions—not once 
condemning ECOWAS for unlawful action or 
inappropriate conduct. 
The Security Council's stance affirmed the 
legality of the ECOWAS action and placed a 
retroactive de jure seal on its Liberia opera­
tion, confirming the existence of a right of 
humanitarian intervention. At the very least, 
the Security Council's approach in this case 
confirmed that an intervention taken outside 
the authority of the UN Charter could indeed 
be legal. The Liberian case was a watershed in 
international peace enforcement and should 
be considered as the first authentic case of 
humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold 
War era. 
Article 58 
In July 1993, three years into its "peace 
creation" mission in Liberia, ECOWAS 
adopted the Revised Treaty of 1993. The 
Revised Treaty was adopted to provide a 
treaty basis for peacekeeping in the future. 
Article 4(e) states that the contracting parties 
of ECOWAS affirm and declare their adher­
ence to the "maintenance of regional peace, 
stability, and security through the promotion 
and strengthening of good neighbourliness". 
Article 58 deals with regional security matters 
and maintains that peace and security are key 
objectives of ECOWAS, in pursuit of which it 
may "establish a regional peace and security 
observation system and peace-keeping forces 
where appropriate". Section 3 of Article 58 
also provides for the adoption of protocols 
detailing provisions governing political co­
operation and regional peace and stability. 
Sierra Leone 
In May and August 1997, ECOWAS inter­
vened in Sierra Leone in order to reverse the 
coup d' etat against the democratically elected 
government of President Ahmed Tijan 
Kabbah and forestall intense civil conflict. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
L E V I T T * A F R I C A ' S  P A T H B R E A K I N G  M O D E L « 5 3  
ECOWAS relied on Article 58 and an arguably 
invalid request by Kabbah to justify its inter­
ventions. Kabbah's request was dubious 
because w hen it was made he was no t in de 
facto control of Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, 
there were other legal bases as w ell for these 
interventions. In October 1997, the Security 
Council supported the ECOWAS intervention 
in Sierra Leone by adopting Resolution 1132, 
which imposed an arms and petroleum 
embargo and travel restrictions against the 
junta. It also empowered ECOWAS to enforce 
the terms of the resolution. Similarly to Secu­
rity Council Resolution 788 on Liberia, Reso­
lution 1132 seems to have placed a retroactive 
de jure seal on the first internationally sup­
ported case of pro-democratic intervention. 
The ECOWAS Framework 
In October 1998, some fourteen months 
after the intervention in Sierra Leone, 
ECOWAS adopted a binding mechanism to 
allow for interstate collaboration in the collec­
tive management of regional security: the 
Framework for the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace­
keeping and Security. The framework sets out 
an elaborate scheme for ECOWAS-ECOMOG 
enforcement operations, including a coherent 
command and control structure. It calls for the 
creation of an ECOWAS Mediation and Secu­
rity Council to authorise all forms of interven­
tion, including military. 
Regarding internal conflicts that are sus­
tained from within, Paragraph 46 of the 
framework provides for military intervention 
by ECOWAS when crises: (1) threaten to 
trigger a humanitarian disaster; (2) pose a 
serious threat to peace and security in the 
sub-region; and (3) erupt following the over­
throw or attempted overthrow of a democrat­
ically elected government. Except for the new 
African Union, no other regional organisation 
has laid down a normative framework for uni­
lateral military intervention. Furthermore, 
Paragraph 52 of the framework provides that 
ECOMOG may undertake military opera­
tions for peacekeeping; humanitarian inter­
vention in support of humanitarian actions; 
and the enforcement of sanctions and 
embargos. ECOWAS is thus the first regional 
arrangement to codify both humanitarian and 
pro-democratic rights of intervention. 
Guinea-Bissau 
Ironically, the framework, which had 
been in ECOWAS's bureaucratic pipeline for 
quite some time, was adopted approximately 
one month before ECOWAS dispatched 
ECOMOG to Guinea-Bissau in December 
1998. ECOMOG replaced Senegalese and 
Guinean troops who had intervened in June 
1998 to save the sitting government from a 
mutiny by high-ranking military officers 
and to avert mass civil conflict between loy­
alist and opposition forces. ECOMOG was 
deployed for the following four reasons: (1) 
to monitor the peace and the imposition of a 
government of national unity; (2) to guar­
antee security along the Senegalese/Guinea-
Bissau border; (3) to keep the warring par­
ties apart; and (4) to guarantee free access to 
humanitarian agencies. What is interesting 
here is that on 26 December 1998, less than 
one week before ECOMOG deployed in 
Guinea-Bissau, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1216, which approved 
of the ECOMOG mission and recognised 
that it might need to employ force to fulfil 
its mandate. 
The ECOWAS Protocol 
In December 1999, approximately one 
year after the introduction of the framework 
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and the launch of the Guinea-Bissau opera­
tion, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol Estab­
lishing the Mechanism for Conflict Preven­
tion, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping 
and Security, which aims to implement further 
Article 58 of the Revised Treaty. A key objec­
tive of the protocol is to prevent, manage and 
resolve internal and interstate conflict—and 
here it states that Paragraph 46 of the frame­
work governs these matters. Like the frame­
work, Article 22 of the protocol states that 
peacekeeping and the restoration of peace, 
humanitarian intervention during humani­
tarian disasters, and the enforcement of sanc­
tions, including embargoes, are key responsi­
bilities of ECOMOG. Article 22 does not 
recognise the authority of the Security Council 
in either adjudicating or maintaining interna­
tional peace and security. Perhaps this is a pos­
itive development, given the United Nations' 
dismal record on managing the crises in 
Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, the Central African 
Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and 
Sudan—to mention just a few operations. 
Article 2 5  of the protocol complements 
Paragraph 46 of the framework, stating that 
ECOWAS may take enforcement action in 
internal conflicts (1) that threaten to trigger a 
humanitarian disaster or pose a serious threat 
to peace and security in the sub-region; (2) 
where there has been a serious and massive 
violation of human rights and the rule of law; 
and (3) when there has been an overthrow or 
attempted overthrow of a democratically 
elected government. Invoking these considera­
tions, ECOWAS sought to establish an 
ECOMOG force along the border areas of 
Guinea and Liberia in December 2000 in order 
to prevent skirmishes between the two coun­
tries from escalating into full-blown conflict. 
This is the background to the development 
of ECOWAS law, which has evolved over the 
past twelve years to meet the growing security 
challenges in west Africa. ECOWAS law not 
only lays down an unambiguous framework 
for the protection of human rights, democracy, 
and the rule of law, it also codifies both 
humanitarian and pro-democratic rights of 
intervention. The revolutionary evolution of 
ECOWAS law comes at the behest of west 
African nations, which have consistently 
demonstrated their willingness to forfeit sov­
ereignty for peace and security. 
Cote d'lvoire 
In October 2000, Cote d' I voire's current 
president, Laurent Gbagbo, was declared the 
winner of a bitterly contested national election 
that was decided in his favour by the country's 
supreme court. He has not been able to bring 
peace to the embattled nation. 
The root of the current crisis in Cote 
d'lvoire dates back to September 2002, when 
approximately eight hundred discontented 
soldiers attacked military installations in the 
commercial, administrative and diplomatic 
centre, Abidjan, and in the second-largest city, 
Bouake, launching a rebellion that divided the 
country between the rebel-controlled north 
and the loyalist south. Gbagbo lost de facto 
control of the country. 
In October 2002, at the request of Presi­
dent Gbagbo, ECOWAS, acting under the 
authority of its protocol, instituted a peace­
keeping force to monitor the cease-fire agree­
ment in Cote d'lvoire. Efforts by ECOWAS, 
the United Nations, France and the African 
Union culminated in the Linas-Marcoussis 
peace agreement of January 2003. In early 
February 2004, the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1527, which fully sup­
ported efforts by ECOWAS and France to 
"promote a peaceful settlement of the con­
flict" and empowered the ECOWAS mission 
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in Cote d'lvoire to stabilise the nation. The 
resolution authorised France to support 
ECOWAS. In late February, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1528 establishing 
the UN Operation in Cote d'lvoire (UNOCI) 
to guarantee the terms of the peace agreement. 
ECOWAS forces were integrated into UNOCI 
and French peacekeeping forces were autho­
rised to "use all necessary means" to support 
the UNOCI mission. 
Legalising Intervention 
ECOWAS has evolved from an organisa­
tion created to spur regional economic inte­
gration and development into a viable 
regional collective security arrangement. The 
harsh consequences of warfare for peace, 
security, democratisation and economic 
development in west Africa have forced 
ECOWAS to proffer normative frameworks to 
manage conflict. The codification of African 
regional customary law allowing for pro-
humanitarian and pro-democratic interven­
tion has influenced the wider corpus of the 
law on intervention and likewise been influ­
enced by it. 
SADC 
ECOWAS is not wholly unique in this 
respect. SADC has established similar 
regional security mechanisms. 
The SADC Treaty and Organ 
SADC emerged in January 1992 as the 
successor organisation to the Southern 
African Development Co-ordination Confer­
ence, which had been founded by the then 
"front-line" states in order to reduce regional 
dependence on apartheid South Africa. The 
succession appears to have been partly 
inspired by the changing political environ­
ment in South Africa following Nelson Man­
dela's release from prison in 1990 and the 
ongoing efforts to dismantle fully the 
country's apartheid system. In October 1993, 
the new SADC treaty entered into force. One 
of its primary objectives is to "promote and 
defend peace and security" in the southern 
African region. 
In June 1996, SADC adopted the "Organ 
for Politics, Defence and Security" (OPDS). 
Key aims of OPDS are to protect the people 
and development of the region against the 
breakdown of law and order and interstate and 
intrastate conflict. OPDS supports co-opera­
tion on regional security through conflict 
management and co-ordination of the partici­
pation of member states in international and 
regional peacekeeping. 
Objective (g) of OPDS states that where 
diplomatic efforts fail, OPDS is responsible for 
recommending punitive measures to the 
summit of the heads of state of SADC mem­
bers. It also states that measures to be taken in 
this regard will be further elaborated in a pro­
tocol on peace, security and conflict resolution. 
The SADC Protocol 
In 1997, the SADC summit adopted a Pro­
tocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the 
SADC Region. Under the protocol, core func­
tions of SADC are protecting people from 
instability arising from the breakdown of law 
and order; conflict prevention, management, 
and resolution; and peacemaking and peace­
keeping to achieve sustainable peace and secu­
rity. Furthermore, as with Paragraph 46 of the 
ECOWAS framework, Article 11 (2)(b) of the 
SADC protocol sets out elaborate criteria for 
when regional intervention in internal con­
flicts is justified, namely, when there is: (1) 
large-scale conflict or violence between sec­
tions of the population of a state, or between 
the state and/or its armed or paramilitary 
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forces and sections of the population; (2) a 
threat to the legitimate authority of the govern­
ment (such as a military coup); (3) a condition 
of civil war or insurgency; and (4) any crisis 
that could threaten the peace and security of 
other member states. The SADC protocol also 
states that OPDS "shall respond to an invita­
tion by a member country to become involved 
in mediating a conflict within its borders". 
Lesotho 
In 1998, when segments of Lesotho's 
civilian population, including opposition 
party supporters and elements in the sitting 
government, backed a mutiny by junior mili­
tary officers, the small landlocked country 
plummeted into chaos. The situation quickly 
deteriorated as loyalist and opposition forces 
clashed on the streets of the capital, Maseru. 
At the request of the lawful government, 
South Africa and Botswana launched a robust 
intervention to thwart any attempt at a coup 
d'etat and to restore law and order in accor­
dance with the SADC protocol. And unlike 
the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, when 
SADC launched its operation in Lesotho, the 
complete legal framework for the intervention 
was already in place. 
ECOWAS and SADC 
A key distinction between the law of 
ECOWAS and that of SADC is that the latter 
appears to be more conservative in seeming to 
require that a country consent to an interven­
tion, whereas the former clearly does not 
require such consent. Moreover, Article 
11 (3)(d) of the SADC protocol requires that 
enforcement action be taken only as a last 
resort and only with the authorisation of the 
Security Council. The ECOWAS framework 
and protocol do not explicitly require such 
authorisation. Yet SADC did not seek any such 
endorsement prior to launching its 1998 oper­
ation in Lesotho. That said, both the SADC 
and ECOWAS treaty regimes have similar cri­
teria for intervention—and both provide for a 
pro-democratic right to intervene. 
The African Union 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union 
came into force in March 2001. The act lays 
out a completely new governance framework 
for the African continent: the African Union's 
new EU-like structure varies considerably 
from that of its predecessor, the Organisation 
of African Unity. 
Article 4 on the principles of the African 
Union includes three very important provi­
sions on regional security and peacekeeping: 
one accords the union the "right" to intervene 
in a member state in respect of "grave circum­
stances", namely, war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity; another accords 
member states the "right" to request the 
African Union to intervene in order to restore 
peace and security; and the third provision 
condemns and rejects unconstitutional 
changes of government. These provisions 
complement and "continentalise" those enu­
merated in the ECOWAS framework and pro­
tocol and in the SADC protocol. In 2003, the 
African Union adopted a peace and security 
protocol to evolve further its peacemaking 
and collective security capability. 
The Peace and Security Protocol 
The protocol establishing the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union 
(AUPSC) came into force on 26 December 
2003, and serves as the first continent-wide, 
regional, collective security system. 
AUPSC is empowered to carry out several 
important functions that complement the 
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above-mentioned security mechanisms in sanctions against regimes that come to power 
Africa. AUPSC's key function is to promote extra-constitutionally. Against this back-
peace, security and stability in Africa through ground, it is more than evident that the 
early warning, preventive diplomacy , media- AUPSC framework was a response to Africa's 
tion, and most important, peace support oper- fragile security environment and reflects the 
ations, intervention, humanitarian action, dis- recognition of African leaders that an appa-
aster management, peace-building, post-con- ratus was needed to deal with any and all secu-
flict reconstruction, and any other function as rity issues, whether man-made or acts of God. 
may be decided on by the African Union. 
AUPSC may employ force i n multiple con- Africa's Daring Example 
texts, whether to thwart conflict and safeguard The willingness of African states to codify 
human rights, to ensure access to humani- criteria for military intervention and openly to 
tanan agencies, or to deliver humanitarian condemn in the continent's foremost political 
relief during natural disasters. body undemocratic seizures of power is 
The AUPSC protocol empowers the astounding. Even more surprising is the fact 
African Union to engage in numerous activi- that African nations have contracted authority 
ties from policy oversight to fully fledged mil- to the African Union to override their sover-
itary intervention. Furthermore, AUPSC is eignty by authorising and launching humani-
charged with instituting "sanctions whenever tarian interventions, demonstrating their com-
an unconstitutional change of Government mitment to achieving peace, security, and sta-
takes place", implementing a "common bility in the continent, 
defense p olicy", and co-ordinating and co­
operating with sub-regional and regional Final Words 
mechanisms (and the United Nations), partic- The birth of this seemingly new African 
ularly on peace and security issues. A frican liberalism on the regional security front has 
Union member states are bound by AUPSC's resulted in a whittling away of the abso-
decisions and actions and "shall extend full lutist/positivist mantle of state sovereignty 
cooperation to, and facilitate action by, the and n on-intervention, and an acceptance of 
Peace and Security Council for the preven- the logic of sovereignty as responsibility, 
tion, management and resolution of crises and While it is true that political elites often have 
conflicts". mixed motives for supporting particular 
The AUPSC protocol confers on the policy prescriptions, democrats and autocrats 
African Union more powers and coherent alike recognise that peace and security are 
legal authority to engage i n peace enforce- precursors to creating an enabling environ­
ment than the UN Charter does the Security ment for authentic political and economic 
Council. The protocol clearly delineates the development. Both reformers and thieves 
circumstances under which intervention may recognise respectively that it is necessary to 
take place, and African Union law creates an have some measure of stability to effectuate 
affirmative duty on member states to institute positive change in, or pilfer, the state; hence, 
2. Sec Jeremy I. Levitt, "The Peace and Security Council of the African Union", Journal of Transnational Law 
and Contemporary Problems 13, no. I (spring 2003), p. 118. 
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there are incentives for both democrats and 
autocrats to operate in a conflict-free environ­
ment. This may explain the general consensus 
among political elites in Africa to endow 
regional bodies with the authority to employ 
under certain circumstances the use of force 
in states. 
Whatever the case may be, it is unambigu­
ously clear that African states and their organ­
isations have created the world's most legally 
coherent frameworks to combat conflict and 
regional insecurity. No other nations or 
regions have offered comparable structures— 
nor demonstrated a similar willingness to sac­
rifice human and tangible resources and sov­
ereignty for peace. While not every African 
intervention discussed above qualifies as a 
humanitarian intervention, the continuity in 
state practice and treaty-law developments 
confirms the existence of, and strengthens, 
the right of humanitarian intervention under 
customary international law. The new African 
interventionism has not only influenced state 
behaviour inside and outside Africa, it has 
also added significant weight to the develop­
ment of the corpus of international law. • 
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